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HUDSON V. MCMILLIAN: CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT
TAKES ONE STEP FORWARD, Two STEPS BACK
I. INTRODUCTION
From 1960 to 1989, the prison population in federal and state insti-
tutions grew from almost 213,000 to over 675,000 inmates. ' Along with
the growth in numbers, this time period saw significant changes in
Eighth Amendment jurisprudence which affected the ability of these
prisoners to file claims alleging Eighth Amendment violations. 2 Histori-
cally, the Supreme Court took the view that the Eighth Amendment ap-
plied only in the context of reviewing the sentencing of prisoners, not
the treatment they received after incarceration. 3 Beginning in 1976 with
Estelle v. Gamble,4 the Court applied the Eighth Amendment to claims
arising from treatment received by incarcerated prisoners. 5 Since Es-
telle, prisoners have directed Eighth Amendment claims at three specific
areas-medical needs, prison conditions and excessive physical force.
Prior to Estelle, no express intent to inflict pain was required for the
Eighth Amendment to be violated. 6 More recently, the Court developed
a two prong test in determining whether a prisoner's Eighth Amend-
ment rights have been violated which requires both an objective and
subjective analysis. The objective analysis asks whether officials inflicted
sufficient harm, and the subjective analysis asks whether officials acted
with a sufficiently culpable mind.
7
In 1990, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals determined that serious
injury was necessary to satisfy the objective component in any claim by a
prisoner alleging excessive force. 8 In Hudson v. McMillian,9 the
Supreme Court addressed the issue of whether the use of excessive
physical force against a prisoner constitutes cruel and unusual punish-
ment under the Eighth Amendment when the prisoner does not suffer
serious physical injury.' 0 Hudson defines the standard for all Eighth
Amendment claims of excessive physical force." The Court held that
serious injury is not required to satisfy the objective component of the
1. U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 1991,
at 193 (111th ed. 1991).
2. The Eighth Amendment provides: "Excessive bail shall not be required, nor ex-
cessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted." U.S. CONST. amend.
VIII.
3. See Hudson v. McMillian, 112 S. Ct. 995, 1005 (1992) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
4. 429 U.S. 97 (1976).
5. Hudson, 112 S. Ct. at 1006 (Thomas, J., dissenting); Wilson v. Seiter, 111 S. Ct.
2321, 2323 (1991).
6. See Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 319, 328-29 (1986).
7. See Wilson, 111 S. Ct. at 2324.
8. Huguet v. Barnett, 900 F.2d 838, 841 (5th Cir. 1990).
9. 112 S. Ct. 995 (1992).
10. Id. at 997.
11. Id.
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Eighth Amendment analysis. 12 The Court further held the subjective
component requires a determination that prison officials acted mali-
ciously and sadistically rather than in a good faith effort to control the
prisoner. 13 This Comment examines the precedent created by Hudson
and its likely future impact against the background of Eighth Amend-
ment analysis and the evolution of the subjective element. In conclu-
sion, this comment specifically and critically analyzes the heightened
subjective standard established by the Court.
II. BACKGROUND
The drafters of the Eighth Amendment penned its words with the
intent to outlaw torture and other cruel punishments. 14 In Trop v. Dul-
les, 15 the Court stated that the basic concept underlying the Eighth
Amendment is the dignity of man. 16 The Court in Trop said that the
words of the amendment are imprecise and their scope not static; that
instead the words must draw their meaning "from the evolving stan-
dards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society."' 17 In
Gregg v. Georgia,18 the Court further directed that measuring punish-
ments against the standard of public decency is not the end of an inquiry
into Eighth Amendment claims; the punishment also cannot be exces-
sive. 19 The Gregg Court defined excessive punishment as that which in-
volves the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain or punishment
grossly disproportionate to the severity of the crime.
20
In Estelle v. Gamble2 ' the Court first addressed the question of
12. Id. at 999.
13. Id.
14. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 102 (1976). For further background on the Eighth
Amendment, see Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 171 (1976) (joint opinion of Stewart,
Powell and Stevens,JJ.); Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 316-22 (1972); Trop v. Dulles,
356 U.S. 86, 99-103 (1958); Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 368-80 (1910);
Anthony F. Granucci, "Nor Cruel and Unusual Punishments Inflicted:" The Original Meaning, 57
CAL. L. REV. 839 (1969) (detailed analysis of the development of the Eighth Amendment);
Ira P. Robbins, Federalism, State Prison Reform, and Evolving Standards of Human Decency On
Guessing, Stressing, and Redressing Constitutional Rights, 26 KAN. L. REV. 551, 552-55 (1978)
(historical perspective of the Eighth Amendment); Malcolm E. Wheeler, Toward a Theory of
Limited Punishment: An Examination of the Eighth Amendment, 24 STAN. L. REV. 838 (1972) (ex-
amining treatment of the amendment by the United States Supreme Court and the ration-
ale for limiting punishments); Note, Constitutional Law--The Cruel and Unusual Punishment
Clause and the Substantive Criminal Law, 79 HARV. L. REv. 635,637 (1966) (historical perspec-
tive of cruel methods of punishment and cruelly excessive punishments); Andre Sansoucy,
Note, Applying The Eighth Amendment To The Use Of Force Against Prison Inmates, 60 B.U. L.
REV. 332, 332-35 (1980) (development of Eighth Amendment jurisprudence); Recent
Case, Constitutional Law--Cruel and Unusual Punishment Provision of Eighth Amendment as Re-
striction Upon State Action Through the Due Process Clause, 34 MINN. L. REV. 134, 135-37 (1949)
(development of the amendment in American history); Recent Development, Constitutional
Law-Cruel and Unusual Punishments-Eighth Amendment Prohibits Excessively Long Sentences, 44
FORDHAM L. REV. 637, 638 (1975) (historical perspective of the Eighth Amendment).
15. 356 U.S. 86 (1958).
16. Id. at 100 (plurality opinion).
17. Id. at 100-01.
18. 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
19. Id. at 173.
20. Id.
21. 429 U.S. 97 (1976).
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whether the Eighth Amendment applied to prisoners' claims when the
punishment was not part of the sentence.22 The prisoner in Estelle
brought a § 198323 action claiming that prison officials violated his
Eighth Amendment rights by refusing him proper medical care. 24 The
Estelle Court stated that punishments "incompatible with the evolving
standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society" and
punishments involving "the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain"
are repugnant to the Eighth Amendment. 25 In Estelle, the Court not
only questioned whether prison officials inflicted pain (the objective
test), it also questioned the mind set of the persons inflicting the pain,
thus introducing a subjective test. 26 Estelle stands for the proposition
that the deliberate indifference to the serious medical needs of prisoners
is incompatible with the standards of decency in society and constitutes
the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain, thus violating the Eighth
Amendment. 27 Further, the Court in Estelle held that the negligent in-
22. See Hudson v. McMillian, 112 S. Ct. 995, 1006 (1992) (Thomas, J., dissenting);
Wilson v. Seiter, Ill S. Ct. 2321, 2323 (1991).
23. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988) provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to
be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdic-
tion thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by
the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law,
suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962), made the Eighth Amendment applicable to
the States through the Fourteenth Amendment. Estelle, 429 U.S. at 101-02. Cooper v.
Pate, 378 U.S. 546 (1964), was the first time the Court recognized that a cause of action
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 could be brought against prison officials. The district court had
dismissed the suit and Cooper appealed in forma pauperis. The Supreme Court reversed
and recognized the cause of action as valid. Cooper was not an Eighth Amendment action,
which is why Estelle is still the first case to address § 1983 actions in the Eighth Amendment
context. A detailed discussion of the relationship between § 1983 actions and the Eighth
Amendment is beyond the scope of this comment. For more information, see MARTIN A.
SCHWARTZ AND JOHN E. KIRKLIN, SECTION 1983 LITIGATION: CLAIMs, DEFENSES, AND FEES
§§ 3.8-3.9 (2nd ed., vol. 1, Supp. 1992); Project, Twenty-First Annual Review of Criminal
Procedure: United States Supreme Court and Court of Appeals 1989 - 1990, 80 GEO. L.J. 939, 1710
(1992); Note, A Review of Prisoners' Rights Litigation Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, 11 U. RICH. L.
REV. 803, 858-80 (1977).
24. Estelle, 429 U.S. at 98. The prisoner in Estelle claimed that he injured his back
while working in the prison and received improper medical treatment. Id.
25. Estelle, 429 U.S. at 102-03 (citing Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958); Gregg v.
Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 173 (1976)).
26. Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104.
27. Id. at 104. The Court ruled that the prisoner's complaint failed to state a claim
against the treating physician and medical director. The Court remanded for a determina-
tion of whether other prison officials displayed deliberate indifference to Gamble's medical
needs. Id. at 108. For more information on prison medical conditions, see Phil Gunby,
Health Care Reforms Still Needed in the Nation's Prisons, 245 JAMA 211 (1981); Wendy Lynn
Adams, Comment, Inadequate Medical Treatment of State Prisoners: Cruel and Unusual Punish-
ment?, 27 Am. U. L. REV. 92 (1977) (addressing the federal courts interpretation of the
Eighth Amendment and the standard applied to prisoner's claims of inadequate medical
treatment); Michael Cameron Friedman, Note, Cruel and Unusual Punishment in the Provision
of Prison Medical Care: Challenging the Deliberate Indifference Standard, 45 VAND. L. REV. 921
(1992) (examination of the standard applied to prisoner's claims under the Eighth Amend-
ment); Robert Dvorchak, Medicine Behind Bars: Quality Care Is Elusive, Despite Lawsuits; Hostile
Public, Shortage of Good Doctors and Nurses Worsen Problem, L.A. TIMES, June 18, 1989, at 2
(discussion of problems in providing adequate medical care in prisons); Elizabeth Levitan
1993]
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fliction of unnecessary and wanton pain provided no cause of action un-
less the prisoner can prove that officials acted with deliberate
indifference. 2 8 The subjective standard, that deliberate indifference
constitutes the "unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain," was applied
specifically in the context of medical needs.
29
In Hutto v. Finney30 the Court addressed the question of whether
prison deprivation claims under § 1983 were valid as Eighth Amend-
ment actions and declared confinement in prison a form of punishment
subject to scrutiny under the amendment.3 ' In Hutto, the prison condi-
tions were so severe, the district court declared them cruel and unusual
and characterized that particular prison as "a dark and evil world com-
pletely alien to the free world."' 32 Because neither party disputed the
district court's finding that the conditions constituted cruel and unusual
punishment, the Court did not address whether the subjective test ap-
plied in the context of deprivation in prison.
3 3
In Rhodes v. Chapman,34 the Court held that placing pairs of prison-
ers in cells measuring sixty-three square feet was not cruel and unusual
punishment.3 5 The Court's analysis focused on the objective test of
whether the deprivations were sufficiently serious to constitute the un-
Spaid, Advocates Urge Better Conditions for Women Inmates, CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, May
29, 1991, at 9.
28. Estelle, 429 U.S. at 105-06.
29. Id. at 104. See also Hudson, 112 S. Ct. at 1000. The introduction of the subjective
element probably resulted because Estelle addressed for the first time whether the Eighth
Amendment applied in the context of the treatment of a prisoner after sentencing. Hud-
son, 112 S. Ct. at 1006 (Thomas, J., dissenting); Wilson v. Seiter, 111 S. Ct. 2321, 2323
(1991).
30. 437 U.S. 678 (1978).
31. Id. at 685. For further discussion of prison condition claims, seeJames E. Robert-
son, The Constitution in Protective Custody: An Analysis of the Rights Of Protective Custody Inmates,
56 U. CIN. L. REV. 91 (1987); Deborah A. Montick, Comment, Challenging Cruel and Unusual
Conditions of Prison Confinement: Refining the Totality of Conditions Approach, 26 How. L.J. 227
(1983).
32. Hutto, 437 U.S. at 681. The prison housed convicts in hundred-man barracks.
Armed convicts known as "creepers" crawled along the floor at night stalking their vic-
tims. Seventeen stabbings occurred in one 18-month period. Homosexual rape was so
common that some prisoners spent the night clinging to the bars nearest one of the guard
stations. Officials allowed prisoners in isolation only 1000 calories of food per day,
although the National Academy of Sciences recommended daily allowance was 2700. Iso-
lated prisoners' meals consisted primarily of 4-inch squares of "grue," a substance created
by mashing meat, potatoes, oleo, syrup, vegetables, eggs and seasoning into a paste and
baking the mixture in a pan. Most of the guards were simply inmates who had been issued
guns. It was "within the power of a trusty guard to murder another inmate with practical
impunity," because trusties with weapons were authorized to use deadly force against es-
capees. One trustee fired his shotgun into a crowded barracks because the inmates would
not turn off their TV. The main issues addressed by the Supreme Court were whether
prisoners could be kept in isolation for more than 30 days and whether the State of Arkan-
sas was responsible for the attorney's fees of the petitioners. Id. at 681-89. For more
information on the duty to protect inmates from violence, see James E. Robertson, Surviv-
ing Incarceration: Constitutional Protection from Inmate Violence, 35 DRAKE L. REV. 101 (1985-
1986); Catherine A. Greene, Comment, Rape: The Unstated Sentence, 15 PAC. L.J. 899 (1984).
33. Hutto, 437 U.S. at 685.
34. 452 U.S. 337 (1981).
35. Id. at 352.
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necessary and wanton infliction of pain.3 6 Although the conditions in
Rhodes inflicted pain on the prisoners, the pain was not sufficient for an
Eighth Amendment violation.3 7 The Court declared that absent serious
deprivation, restrictive and harsh conditions are often part of the pen-
alty that criminal offenders pay for their offenses against society.3 8 In
both Hutto and Rhodes, the decisions were based on the "objective" anal-
ysis of whether the deprivations were serious enough to constitute cruel
and unusual punishment,3 9 and no consideration was given to whether
the officials acted with a culpable state of mind.
40
The subjective element of the Estelle decision was not lost, however,
because the Court specifically addressed the subjective element in its
next major Eighth Amendment case: Whitley v. Albers. 4 1 In Whitley, pris-
oners rioted and took a guard hostage. 4 2 While trying to free the guard,
prison officials shot the plaintiff in the leg as he attempted to get back to
his cell.4 3 Whitley addressed the issue of what standard governs a pris-
oner's § 1983 claim that prison officials subjected him to cruel and unu-
sual punishment by shooting him during the course of quelling a prison
riot.4 4 The Whitley Court reaffirmed that the unnecessary and wanton
infliction of pain upon prisoners is a violation of the Eighth Amend-
ment.4 5 However, the Court went on to say that what is unnecessary
and wanton must vary according to the context in which the Eighth
Amendment violation is charged. 46 The context in Whitley was the use
of physical force during an effort to quash a prison riot.4 7 In Estelle, the
context was the refusal of medical care. 48 Because of the contextual dif-
ferences, the Whitley Court refused to apply the subjective standard of
deliberate indifference established by the Estelle Court in determining
36. Id. at 347.
37. Id. at 348-49. For further discussion of prison overcrowding, see Debra Boren-
stein, Double-Ceiling at Pontiac: Are Inmates Being Subjected to Cruel and Unusual Punishment Aris-
ing Out of Overcrowded Conditions?, 60 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 291 (1984); Robert G. Leger,
Perception of Crowding, Racial Antagonism and Aggression in a Custodial Prison, 16 J. CRIM. JUST.
167 (1988).
38. Hutto, 452 U.S. at 347.
39. Wilson v. Seiter, 111 S. Ct. 2321, 2324 (1991).
40. Id.
41. 475 U.S. 312 (1986). For a more detailed analysis of Whitley, see Elizabeth A.
Blackburn, Note, Prisoners' Rights: Will They Remain Protected After Whitley?, 16 STETrSON L.
REV. 385 (1986); Melissa Whish Coan, Comment, Whitely [sic] v. Albers: The Supreme
Court's Attempted Synthesis of Eighth Amendment Standards for Prison Officials, 14 NEW ENG. J. ON
CRIM. & CIv. CONFINEMENr 155 (1988); Robert A. West, Comment, Constitutional Law: Quel-
ling a Prison Riot: Cruel and Unusual Punishment or a Necessary Infliction of Pain?, 26 WASHBURN
L.J. 208 (1986).
42. Whitley, 475 U.S. at 314-15.
43. Id. at 316.
44. Whitley, 475 U.S. at 314. See Kathryn R. Urbonya, Establishing a Deprivation of a
Constitutional Right to Personal Security Under Section 1983: The Use of Unjustified Force by State
Officials in Violation of the Fourth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments, 51 ALB. L. REV. 173
(1987).
45. Whitley, 475 U.S. at 319.
46. Id. at 320.
47. Id.
48. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976).
1993]
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whether the infliction of pain was unnecessary and wanton. 49
In its attempt to establish a standard to apply in the context of a
prison riot, the Whitley Court looked to a Second Circuit Court of Ap-
peals decision:Johnson v. Glick. 50 In Johnson, a prison guard at the Man-
hattan House of Detention for Men beat a prisoner being held on a
felony charge. 5 1 The court of appeals addressed Johnson's excessive
force claim under the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
rather than as an Eighth Amendment action. 52 The Second Circuit em-
phasized that constitutional protection is not as extensive as common
law battery claims and that not every push or shove by a guard consti-
tutes excessive force, even if it later seems unnecessary. 53 Johnson estab-
lished a test for determining whether excessive force had been used that
involved four factors: (1) the need for the application of force; (2) the
relationship between the need and the amount of force used; (3) the
extent of the injury inflicted; and (4) whether the force applied was in a
good faith effort to maintain or restore discipline or done maliciously
and sadistically for the very purpose of causing harm.
5 4
The Supreme Court in Whitley adopted the fourth element of the
Second Circuit's Johnson test 55 and held that determining whether offi-
cials inflicted unnecessary and wanton pain in the context of controlling
a prison riot turns on whether they applied force in a good faith effort to
maintain or restore discipline or maliciously and sadistically for the very
purpose of causing harm.56 Because it found that the prison officials
shot Whitley in a good faith effort to quell the prison riot, the Court
held that the shooting did not meet the standard of malicious and sadis-
tic behavior and therefore did not violate the Eighth Amendment under
the new test.
5 7
In establishing the higher subjective threshold, the Court recog-
nized the pressures facing prison officials in an emergency situation. 58
The new subjective threshold in the context of a prison riot allowed the
Court to ensure that prison officials would have wide-ranging bounda-
ries in which to carry out their responsibilities. 5 9 The practical effect of
49. Whitey, 475 U.S. at 320.
50. 481 F.2d 1028 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1033 (1973). For further discussion
ofJohnson, see Andre Sansoucy, Note, Applying the Eighth Amendment to the Use of Force Against
Prison Inmates, 60 B.U. L. REV. 332, 335-36 (1980).
51. Johnson, 481 F.2d at 1029.
52. Id. at 1031-32. There appear to be two reasons the Johnson court did not address
the Eighth Amendment issue: 1) the court felt that the Eighth Amendment only applied to
the deliberate infliction of punishment by judicial sentences or legislative acts, and 2) the
beating of the prisoner took place before conviction and sentencing, and the court felt that
the Eighth Amendment only applied to claims arising after sentencing and conviction.
The court inJohnson found that the claim was valid because the prisoner had been denied
due process as guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment. Id.
53. Id. at 1033.
54. Id.
55. Whitley, 475 U.S. at 320-21.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 326.
58. Id. at 320.
59. Id. at 321-22. Justice Marshall dissented and filed an opinion in which Justices
[Vol. 70:2
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Whitley was to establish a subjective standard of "malicious and sadistic"
infliction of pain as the test for claims of Eighth Amendment violations
in the context of a prison riot. When adopting the fourth element of the
Johnson test (that is, whether officials applied the force in a good faith
effort to maintain or restore discipline), the Whitley Court suggested that
the first three elements of the test related to the ultimate determination
of the whether the force was malicious and sadistic.60 However, the vast
majority of lower federal courts began to use all four elements of the
Johnson test to determine all excessive force claims, including Eighth
Amendment claims. 6 1
The next major case to address the Eighth Amendment rights of
prisoners was Wilson v. Seiter.6 2 Wilson was another case brought under
section 1983 charging prison officials with cruel and unusual punish-
ment because of deprivations in prison.63 The prisoners in Wilson
brought general complaints of overcrowding, excessive noise, insuffi-
cient locker storage space, inadequate heating and cooling, improper
ventilation, unclean and inadequate rest rooms and unsanitary dining
facilities and food preparation. 6 4 The Wilson Court followed the prece-
dents of Hutto and Rhodes and described the objective test as a determi-
nation of whether the deprivation was sufficiently serious to constitute
the infliction of unnecessary and wanton pain.6 5 However, Wilson went
beyond the precedents of Hutto and Rhodes, firmly establishing the sub-
jective test as a necessary part of an Eighth Amendment analysis when
applied to prisoners' claims about the treatment they receive after incar-
ceration.6 6 In establishing the importance of the subjective test, the Wil-
son Court broadened Estelle and Whitley by holding that whether a case
was one of conditions of confinement, supplying medical needs or of
restoring official control over a prison riot, courts should inquire into
the prison official's state of mind when it is claimed that the official in-
flicted cruel and unusual punishment. 6 7 The Court went on to state that
if the inflicted pain is not formally administered as punishment ordered
by a statute or sentencing judge, some mental element must be attrib-
uted to the inflicting officer before the punishment can qualify as cruel
Brennan, Blackmun and Stevens joined because they felt the malicious and sadistic stan-
dard would make it too difficult for prisoners injured in riots to successfully bring Eighth
Amendment actions. Id. at 328.
60. Id. at 321. See also Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 398 n.lI (1989).
61. See Graham, 490 U.S. at 393.
62. 111 S. Ct. 2321 (1991). For a more detailed discussion of Wilson, see Arthur B.
Berger, Note, Wilson v. Seiter: An Unsatisfying Attempt at Resolving the Imbroglio of Eighth
Amendment Prisoners' Rights Standards, 1992 UTAH L. REV. 565; Russell W. Gray, Note, Wil-
son v. Seiter: Defining the Components of and Proposing a Direction for Eighth Amendment Prison
Condition Law, 41 AM. U. L. REV. 1339 (1992); Amanda Rubin, Note, Before And After Wilson
v. Seiter: Cases Challenging the Conditions of Confinement in the Ninth Circuit, 22 GOLDEN GATE
U. L. REV. 207 (1992).
63. Wilson, 111 S. Ct. at 2322.
64. Id.
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and unusual. 68 Wilson affirmed the context-specific approach to ques-
tions of whether officials inflicted unnecessary and wanton pain69 and
adopted the deliberate indifference standard from Estelle as the subjec-
tive standard in the context of prison confinement claims. 70 Wilson also
left intact the objective test articulated in Hutto and Rhodes.7
In Huguet v. Barnett,72 the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals combined
the objective and subjective elements of an Eighth Amendment analysis
into a four part test. Under this analysis a prisoner was required to
prove four elements to prevail in an Eighth Amendment claim: (1) a sig-
nificant injury73 which; (2) resulted directly and solely from the use of
force which was clearly excessive; (3) objectively unreasonable; and (4)
an unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.74 Proof of all four ele-
ments was mandatory for a successful claim. 75 The court said that the
first three elements of the test embodied the objective part of an Eighth
Amendment analysis and the fourth element embodied the subjective
test.76 This evolution of the objective and subjective tests of the Eighth
Amendment provides the setting for Hudson v. McMillian.
77
III. HUDSON V. MCMILLIAN
In Hudson, the United States Supreme Court held that serious injury
is not required in order to satisfy the Eighth Amendment's objective
test.78 The Court further established that the subjective test in all
Eighth Amendment excessive force claims requires a determination of
whether the prison official acted in good faith or maliciously and sadisti-
cally in inflicting the harm.
7 9
A. Facts and Procedural History
The petitioner, Keith Hudson, was an inmate at the state peniten-
tiary in Angola, Louisiana.8° The respondents, Jack McMillian, Marvin
68. Id. at 2325.
69. Id. at 2326.
70. Id. at 2327.
71. Id. at 2324. See also Hudson v. McMillian, 112 S. Ct. 995, 1001 (1992).
72. 900 F.2d 838, 841 (5th Cir. 1990).
73. The serious injury requirement of the Huguet court's test may follow from looking
at the objective elements of Wilson and Estelle, which required serious deprivations and
serious medical needs respectively. See Wilson v. Seiter, Ill S. Ct. 2321, 2324 (1991);
Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976). The Johnson court's language in stating that
not every common law battery rises to the level of a constitutional violation may have been
another factor in requiring serious injury. See Johnson v. Glick, 481 F.2d 1028, 1033 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1033 (1973). For a discussion of constitutional torts, see Theo-
dore Eisenberg & Stewart Schwab, The Reality of Constitutional Tort Litigation, 72 CORNELL L.
REV. 641 (1987).
74. Huguet, 900 F.2d at 841.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. 112 S. Ct. 995 (1992). See also Martin A. Schwartz, The Prisoner Beating Case, N.Y.
L.J., Apr. 21, 1992, at 3.
78. Hudson, 112 S. Ct. at 997.
79. Id. at 999.
80. Id. at 997.
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Woods and Arthur Mezo, served as corrections security officers at the
Angola facility. 8 ' On October 30, 1983, Hudson and McMillian argued,
so McMillian and Woods placed Hudson in handcuffs and shackles, took
him out of his cell, and walked him toward the penitentiary's "adminis-
trative lockdown" area. 82 On the way there, McMillian punched Hud-
son in the mouth, eyes, chest and stomach while Woods held Hudson in
place and kicked and punched him from behind.8 3 Mezo, the supervisor
on duty, watched the beating but merely told the officers "not to have
too much fun."' 84 As a result of the beating, Hudson suffered minor
bruises and swelling of his face, mouth and lip. 85 The blows also loos-
ened Hudson's teeth and cracked his partial dental plate, rendering it
unusable for several months.
86
Hudson brought a claim under section 198387 alleging that the
beating administered by prison guards violated the Eighth Amend-
ment's prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment.8 8 The parties con-
sented to the case being tried before a magistrate,8 9 who found: (1) that
Hudson's injuries were minor; (2) that McMillian and Woods used force
when there was no need to do so; and (3) that Mezo expressly condoned
their actions. 90 The magistrate awarded Hudson damages of $800.91
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed. 92 The circuit court applied
the test it laid down in Huguet93 and held that inmates alleging the use
of excessive force in violation of the Eighth Amendment must prove:
(1) significant injury, (2) resulting directly and only from the use of force
clearly excessive to the need, (3) the excessiveness of which was objec-
tively unreasonable, and (4) that the action constituted an unnecessary
and wanton infliction of pain.94 The court's test required that all ele-
ments be met before there could be an Eighth Amendment violation, 9 5
and the court determined that the force used by McMillian and Woods
met all of the elements except for the significant injury element. 96 The
United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine if the use
of excessive physical force against a prisoner constitutes cruel and unu-
sual punishment when the inmate does not suffer serious injury. 97
81. Id.
82. Id. Neither the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals nor the Supreme Court gave a defi-
nition of the "administrative lockdown" area or its purpose.




87. Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988). See supra note 23 for full text of the
statute.
88. Hudson, 112 S. Ct. at 997-98.
89. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(c) (1988).
90. Hudson, 112 S. Ct. at 998.
91. Id.
92. Hudson v. McMillian, 929 F.2d 1014 (5th Cir. 1990), rev'd, 112 S. Ct. 995 (1992).
93. Huguet v. Barnett, 900 F.2d 838, 841 (5th Cir. 1990). For background, see supra
notes 72-77 and accompanying text.
94. Hudson, 929 F.2d at 1015 (citing Huguet, 900 F.2d at 841).
95. Id.
96. Hudson, 929 F.2d at 1015.
97. Hudson, 112 S. Ct. at 997, 1004.
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B. Holding
1. Majority Opinion
Justice O'Connor's majority opinion revisited Whitley and affirmed
the underlying principle that the unnecessary and wanton infliction of
pain constitutes cruel and unusual punishment.9 8 Justice O'Connor
noted, however, that the standard for "unnecessary and wanton inflic-
tion of pain" varies according to the context of the alleged constitu-
tional violation, 99 pointing to Estelle and citing the deliberate
indifference standard in medical needs cases as an example of the vari-
ance.10 0 The deliberate indifference standard in Estelle was termed ap-
propriate because the majority felt that the State's responsibility to
provide inmates with medical care did not ordinarily conflict with com-
peting administrative concerns. 10 '
In reviewing Whitley, the Court stated that in the context of a prison
riot, different concerns arise than in the medical needs context. 10 2 In
the riot context, prison officials are concerned with the threat unrest
poses to the inmates, prison workers, administrators and visitors.
1 03
Prison officials must balance these concerns against the harm that in-
mates may suffer if guards use force and then make a decision in haste,
under pressure and often without the opportunity of a second
chance. 104 Because of the different concerns in Whitley's prison riot con-
text, the deliberate indifference standard was rejected and replaced by a
malicious and sadistic standard.
10 5
In a major expansion of the Whitley doctrine, the Court concluded
that the same underlying concerns arise any time a guard must use force
to maintain order, whether in a riot situation or not. 10 6 Whether the
prison disturbance is a riot or lesser disturbance (such as the one that
involved Hudson) prison officials must still balance the need to maintain
order through force against the risk of injury to inmates. 10 7 Both situa-
tions, a riot or lesser disturbance, require officials to act quickly and de-
cisively, therefore, both situations trigger the principle that prison
administrators should be given wide-ranging deference in carrying out
the responsibility of maintaining order in the prison.' 0 8 Because of the
98. Id. at 998 (citing Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 319 (1986)).
99. Id. (citing Whitley, 475 U.S. at 320).
100. Id. (citing Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976)).
101. Id. (citing Whitley, 475 U.S. at 320).
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id. (citing Whitley, 475 U.S. at 320).
105. Id. (citing Whitley, 475 U.S. at 320-21).
106. Id. at 998.
107. Id. at 998-99.
108. Id. at 999 (citing Whitley, 475 U.S. at 321-22). See also Rhodes v. Chapman, 452
U.S. 337, 349 n.14 (1981) ("a prison's internal security is peculiarly a matter normally left
to the discretion of prison administrators"); Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 547 (1979)
("Prison administrators therefore should be accorded wide-ranging deference in the adop-
tion and execution of policies and practices that in their judgment are needed to preserve
internal order and discipline and to maintain institutional security."). For further discus-
sion ofjudicial deference, see Emily Calhoun, The Supreme Court and The Constitutional Rights
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similarities between riots and lesser disturbances, the Court held that
the new standard by which to judge all claims of excessive force is the
test set forth in Whitley: whether the force is applied in a good-faith ef-
fort to maintain or restore discipline, or applied maliciously and sadisti-
cally to cause harm. 10 9 Citing appellate decisions from the Second,
Fourth, Sixth, Eighth, and Eleventh Circuits, the Court reasoned that
extending the Whitley standard to all claims of excessive force estab-
lished nothing new for most circuits. 110 After establishing the new stan-
dard for an excessive force claim, the Court determined the role that the
extent of injury plays in the standard.
Under the Whitley test, the extent of injury was simply one factor
that suggests whether prison officials thought force was necessary or
whether the force evidenced an unnecessary and malicious infliction of
pain." '1 The Hudson Court suggested several other factors appropriate
in evaluating whether the force was unnecessary and malicious: (1) the
need for application of the force; (2) the relationship between the need
and the amount of force used; (3) the threat reasonably perceived by the
responsible officials; and (4) any efforts made to temper the severity of a
forceful response. 1 2 Based on these relevant factors, the Court con-
cluded that the absence of a serious injury is relevant to the Eighth
Amendment inquiry, but does not end the analysis."13 Addressing the
respondent's claim that the objective analysis requires a serious injury,
the Court said that the objective element of an Eighth Amendment claim
requires asking if the alleged wrongdoing was "harmful enough" to es-
tablish a constitutional violation." 4 The subjective analysis determines
whether the officials acted with a "sufficiently culpable state of
mind." 115
In addressing the objective standard, the Court said that what is
necessary to show harm for purposes of the Eighth Amendment de-
pends on the claim at issue for two reasons. 116 First, the Eighth Amend-
ment should be applied with due regard for differences in the kind of
of Prisoners: A Reappraisal, 4 HASTINGS CoNsT. L.Q. 219 (1977); Peter Keenan, Constitutional
Law: The Supreme Court's Recent Battle Against Judicial Oversight of Prison Affairs, 1989 ANN.
SURV. AM. L. 507 (1990); Irene Lambrou, Comment, AIDS Behind Bars: Prison Responses and
Judicial Deference, 62 TEMP. L. REV. 327 (1989).
109. Hudson, 112 S. Ct. at 999.
110. Id. See Stenzel v. Ellis, 916 F.2d 423, 427 (8th Cir. 1990); Miller v. Leathers, 913
F.2d 1085, 1087 (4th Cir. 1990); Haynes v. Marshall, 887 F.2d 700, 703 (6th Cir. 1989);
Corselli v. Coughlin, 842 F.2d 23, 26 (2d Cir. 1988); Brown v. Smith, 813 F.2d 1187, 1188
(11 th Cir. 1987). But see Unwin v. Campbell, 863 F.2d 124, 130 (1st Cir. 1988) (rejecting
application of Whitley standard absent "an actual disturbance"); Wyatt v. Delaney, 818 F.2d
21, 23 (8th Cir. 1987) (absent matters involving institutional security a deliberate indiffer-
ence standard should be used).
111. Hudson, 112 S. Ct. at 999 (citing Whitley, 475 U.S. at 321).
112. Id. The Court did not clearly state the role these elements play in determining
whether force was malicious and sadistic. One commentator suggests that these elements
are the proper basis for making that determination. Martin A. Schwartz, The Prisoner Beat-
ing Case, N.Y. L.J., Apr. 21, 1992, at 3.
113. Hudson, 112 S. Ct. at 999.
114. Id. (citing Wilson v. Seiter, 111 S. Ct. 2321, 2326 (1991)).
115. Id. (citing Wilson, 111 S. Ct. at 2329).
116. Hudson, 112 S. Ct. at 1000.
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conduct against which the objection is lodged (i.e., physical force, prison
deprivation or medical needs). 1 7 Second, the prohibition of cruel and
unusual punishment draws its meaning from the evolving standards of
decency that mark the progress of a maturing society."18 These two
concerns result in an objective element of an Eighth Amendment claim
that is contextual and responsive to contemporary standards of de-
cency. 119 By way of illustration, the Court first reviewed claims directed
at conditions of confinement. 120 Noting that routine discomfort is part
of the penalty that offenders pay for their offenses, only deprivations
which deny the minimal civilized measure of life's necessities do not fit
with contemporary standards of decency.121 Second, the Court made a
similar analysis of medical needs claims. 12 2 It reasoned that society
does not expect prisoners to have unqualified access to health care,
therefore only deliberate indifference to medical needs does not fit with
contemporary standards of decency.
123
In an excessive force context, society's expectations are different. 1
24
Whenever prison officials maliciously and sadistically use force to cause
harm, they violate contemporary standards of decency. ' 2 5 If only serious
injury violated contemporary standards of decency, the Eighth Amend-
ment would permit any physical punishment, no matter how cruel and
inhumane, as long as it resulted in minor injuries. ' 2 6 The Court empha-
sized that doing away with the serious injury requirement did not make
every touch or shove by a prison guard an actionable Eighth Amend-
ment claim. 12 7 The Eighth Amendment excludes from constitutional
recognition the de minimis use of force, provided that the force is not
repugnant to the conscience of mankind. 128 Since Hudson's injuries
were found to be more than de minimis, there was no basis for the dis-
missal of his claim. 1
2 9
The majority then addressed the dissent's argument that by not re-
quiring serious injury, the holding in Wilson was misapplied.130 The ma-
jority distinguished Wilson in two ways: (1) it was not an excessive force
claim, and (2) it did not address the objective analysis of the Eighth
117. Id. (citing Whitley, 475 U.S. at 320).
118. Hudson, 112 S. Ct. at 1000 (citing Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 346 (1981)).
119. Id. at 1000.
120. Id.
121. Id..(citing Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 347).
122. Id. at 1000 (citing Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103-04 (1976) (only deliberate
indifference to medical needs did not fit with contemporary standards of decency)).
123. Id. See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103-04 (1976).
124. Hudson, 112 S. Ct. at 999.
125. Id. See Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 327 (1986).
126. Hudson, 112 S. Ct. at 999. See Estelle, 429 U.S. at 102. In Hudson,Justice O'Connor
stated that allowing physical punishments that only resulted in minor injuries "would have
been as unacceptable to the drafters of the Eighth Amendment as it is today." Hudson, 112
S. Ct. at 1000 (citing Estelle, 429 U.S. at 102).
127. Hudson, 112 S. Ct. at 999 (citing Johnson v. Glick, 481 F.2d 1028, 1033 (2d Cir.
1973)).
128. Id. (citing Whitley, 475 U.S. at 327).
129. Id. at 1001.
130. Id. at 1001. See Wilson v. Seiter, Ill S. Ct. 2321 (1991).
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Amendment inquiry.'13 Next, the difference in analyzing conditions of
confinement claims and excessive force claims was reemphasized.1
3 2
Justice O'Connor asked:
How could it be otherwise when the constitutional touchstone
is whether punishment is cruel and unusual? To deny, as the
dissent does, the difference between punching a prisoner in the
face and serving him unappetizing food is to ignore the " 'con-
cepts of dignity, civilized standards, humanity, and decency' "
that animate the Eighth Amendment.'"3
The opinion concluded with a refusal to address the respondent's claim
that an isolated and unauthorized act of violence was not "punishment"
under the Eighth Amendment. 134 This refusal was based on the court
of appeals having left intact the Magistrate's decision that the beating
was not an isolated assault, as there was testimony that McMillian and
Woods had beat another inmate shortly thereafter.' 3 5 The Court re-




Justice Stevens filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring
in the judgment. 137 He argued that the justification for the higher stan-
dard of malicious and sadistic in Whitley is that emergency situations,
such as prison riots, necessitate quick decisions and reactions.1 38 Ab-
sent an emergency situation, however, Justice Stevens felt that the less
demanding standard of unnecessary and wanton should be applied.1
3 9
The rationale was that the unnecessary and wanton standard was more
consistent with the principle that courts give due regard to the differ-
ences in the kind of conduct against which an Eighth Amendment viola-
tion is charged. 1
4 0
Justice Blackmun filed an opinion concurring in the judgment.
141
He disagreed with the majority's extension of the malicious and sadistic
131. Hudson, 112 S. Ct. at 1001.
132. Id.
133. Id. (quoting Estelle, 429 U.S. at 102).
134. Hudson, 112 S. Ct. at 1001. The Court did recognize that other courts have ad-
dressed the issue. See George v. Evans, 633 F.2d 413,416 (5th Cir. 1980) ("a single, unau-
thorized assault by a guard does not constitute cruel and unusual punishment"); Johnson
v. Glick, 481 F.2d 1028, 1032 (2d Cir.) cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1033 (1973) ("although a
spontaneous attack by a guard is 'cruel' and, we hope 'unusual,' it does not fit any ordinary
concept of 'punishment' "). But see Duckworth v. Franzen, 780 F.2d 645, 652 (7th Cir.
1985) cert. denied, 479 U.S. 816 (1986) ("If a guard decided to supplement a prisoner's
official punishment by beating him, this would be punishment .
135. Hudson, 112 S. Ct. at 1001-02.
136. Id. at 1002.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id. (citing Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976)). Justice Stevens also dis-
sented in Whitley to the establishment of the malicious and sadistic standard. Whitley v.
Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 328 (1986) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
140. Hudson, 112 S. Ct. at 1002.
141. Id.
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standard to all allegations of excessive force. 14 2 Justice Blackmun ad-
dressed the respondents' claim that not requiring excessive injury would
cause the courts to be overburdened with prisoners' suits. 143 He rea-
soned that the floodgates would not be opened for several reasons:
(1) prisoners are required to exhaust administrative remedies under sec-
tion 1983; (2) officials may raise a qualified immunity defense and
(3) district courts may dismiss any complaint found to be frivolous or
malicious. 144 He stated that the burden on the courts is worth bearing
when a prisoner's suit has merit and that the right to file for legal re-
dress in the courts is probably more valuable to a prisoner than to any
other citizen.14 5 Justice Blackmun expressed his opinion that the Eighth
Amendment prohibits "pain," not "injury," and that pain, in its ordi-
nary meaning, surely includes a notion of psychological harm. 14 6 The
Justice concluded by stating that psychological pain that is above de
minimis would surely be actionable in an Eighth Amendment setting. 147
3. Dissenting Opinion
Justice Thomas filed a dissenting opinion, his first writing for the
court, in which Justice Scalia joined.148 Justice Thomas disagreed with
the majority's decision that a prisoner is not required to prove serious
injury to have an actionable claim under the Eighth Amendment. 149 He
stated that allowing any tortious conduct to rise to the level of a consti-
tutional claim goes far beyond the precedents of the Court.150
Justice Thomas would have affirmed the Fifth Circuit's judgment.
Emphasizing that the magistrate who found the facts in the case consid-
ered Hudson's injuries minor, Justice Thomas appeared shocked that
142. Id. at 1003. Justice Blackmun also dissented in Whitley to the establishment of the
malicious and sadistic standard. Whitley, 475 U.S. at 328.
143. Hudson, 112 S. Ct. at 1003.
144. Id. at 1003-04.
145. Id. Prisoners have a constitutional right to adequate, effective and meaningful
access to courts to challenge violations of constitutional rights. Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S.
817, 824, 828 (1977). See O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 355 (1987) (Bren-
nan, J. dissenting):
When prisoners emerge from the shadows to press a constitutional claim, they
invoke no alien set of principles drawn from a distant culture. Rather, they speak
the language of the charter upon which all of us rely to hold official power ac-
countable. They ask us to acknowledge that power exercised in the shadows must
be restrained at least as diligently as power that acts in the sunlight. In reviewing
a prisoner's claim of the infringement of a constitutional fight, we must therefore
begin from the premise that, as members of this society, prisoners retain constitu-
tional rights that limit the exercise of official authority against them.
See also Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 321 (1972) ("[P]ersons in prison, like other individu-
als, have the right to petition the Government for redress of grievances which, of course,
includes 'access to the courts for the purpose of presenting their complaints' ") (citing
Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483,485 (1969));JoHN W. PALMER, CONSTrrrrioNAL RIGHTrS OF
PRISONERS §§ 11.5-11.6 (4th ed. 1991).
146. Hudson, 112 S. Ct. at 1003.
147. Id.
148. Id. at 1004. For a scathing critique of Justice Thomas's dissenting opinion see
Stuart Taylor, Jr.,Justice Thomas Strikes Cruel and Unusual Pose, N.J. L.J., March 16, 1992, at
16.




the majority would broadly assert "that any 'unnecessary and wanton'
use of physical force against a prisoner automatically amounts to 'cruel
and unusual' punishment." ' 5 ' In justice Thomas's view: "a use of force
that causes only insignificant harm to a prisoner may be immoral, it may
be tortious, it may be criminal, and it may even be remediable under
other provisions of the Federal Constitution, but it is not 'cruel and unu-
sual punishment.' "1152
Emulating the jurisprudential style favored by Justice Scalia,
Thomas began his analysis with an historical overview of the Eighth
Amendment. 153 Relying heavily on Weems v. United States,154 Thomas
stated that the original intent of the framers was that the Eighth Amend-
ment apply only to statutorily created punishments and criminal sen-
tencing. 155 There is nothing in 185 years of Eighth Amendment
jurisprudence-from the adoption of the Amendment in 1791 until the
decision in Estelle-indicating that the Eighth Amendment applied to
deprivations suffered in prison. 15 6 Thomas rationalized that:
Surely prison was not a more congenial place in the early years
of the republic than it is today; nor were our judges and com-
mentators so naive as to be unaware of the often harsh condi-
tions of prison life. Rather, they simply did not conceive of the
Eighth Amendment as protecting inmates from harsh treat-
ment. Thus, historically, the lower courts routinely rejected
prisoner grievances by explaining that the courts had no role in
regulating prison life.1
5 7
He concluded that the Eighth Amendment was originally intended to
apply only to sentences given by judges, not to hardships endured by
prisoners after incarceration. 158
Thomas proceeded to discuss the standards established by the
Court for medical needs claims in Estelle and prison deprivation claims in
Rhodes.159 Justice Thomas stated that Estelle required a prisoner to show
deliberate indifference to serious medical needs and that Rhodes re-
quired a prisoner to show serious deprivation to be successful with the
claim.' 60 Justice Thomas reasoned that these two cases show that the
Eighth Amendment only applies to a narrow class of conduct resulting
in serious injury. 1 6 1 He said that the majority turned the Eighth
Amendment inquiry into a strictly subjective test resulting in an unwar-
ranted and unfortunate break with the Court's Eighth Amendment
151. Id. at 1005.
152. Id.
153. Id. For an example of justice Scalia's historical jurisprudential approach, see
Burnham v. Superior Court, 495 U.S. 604, 605 (1990).
154. 217 U.S. 349 (1910).
155. Hudson, 112 S. Ct. at 1005.
156. Id. at 1005-06.
157. Id. at 1005.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Id. See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976); Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S.
337, 347 (1981).
161. Hudson, 112 S. Ct. at 1006.
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jurisprudence. 162
Justice Thomas also disagreed with the higher standard of malicious
and sadistic established by the Court for the subjective test. 163 He
noted that most excessive force cases are not situations of prisoner un-
rest that require a prison guard to keep order.164 Justice Thomas stated
that because so many excessive force claims are not prisoner unrest
cases, the use of the force will seldom be accompanied by a malicious
and sadistic mindset. 16 5 Before concluding, Justice Thomas addressed
whether an Eighth Amendment injury always has to be a physical in-
jury. 16 6 He stated that forms of punishment that inflict psychological




The United States Supreme Court's decision in Hudson, which does
not require serious injury for Eighth Amendment claims, provides pris-
oners with more access to the courts because any infliction of pain,
above de minimis, will be the basis for an action. The respondents in
Hudson felt that it would be detrimental to allow prisoners more access
to file constitutionally-based claims because it would overburden the
courts. 168 While the Court's decision may increase case-loads, the po-
tential deterrent effect of closer scrutiny on prisons could cause less un-
necessary force, and actually lead to fewer prisoner suits. Prison
administrators, officials and guards will now have notice that excessive
force suits are easier to file. This should provide motivation for better
supervision and alternative methods of control besides beating prison-
ers. The Court's decision may decrease the amount of unnecessary pain
inflicted on prisoners because any unnecessary pain will be actionable.
The Court's decision also recognizes that rights still exist for pris-
oners. The goal of incarceration in the criminal justice system should be
rehabilitating prisoners and returning to society people who are produc-
tive citizens. The Court previously recognized this goal in Rhodes v.
Chapman, stating that the function of the criminal justice system is "to
punish justly, to deter future crime, and to return imprisoned persons to
society with an improved chance of being useful, law-abiding citi-
zens.' 169 In Pell v. Procunier, the Court acknowledged that incarceration
162. Id. at 1007.
163. Id. at 1008.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Id. at 1008-10.
167. Id. at 1009.
168. Id. at 1003-04.
169. 452 U.S. 337, 352 (1981). See also Ex Parte Lee, 171 P. 958, 959 (Cal. 1918) ("In-
stead of trying to break the will of the offender and make him submissive, the purpose is to
strengthen his will to do right and lessen his temptation to do wrong."); HERBERT L.
PACKER, THE LImIrTs OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION 36-58 (1968); SOL RUBIN, THE LAW OF
CRIMINAL CORRECTION 755-64 (2d ed. 1973); 1 CHARLEs E. TORCIA, WHARTON'S CRIMINAL
LAW § 4 (1978); Kathleen Engel & Stanley Rothman, The Paradox of Prison Reform: Rehabilita-
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serves a protective function by quarantining criminal offenders for a
given period of time. 170 However, Pell emphasized that most offenders
will return to society, therefore, a paramount objective of the correc-
tions system is the rehabilitation of prisoners. 171 While society punishes
prisoners by incarcerating and stripping them of certain individual
rights, 17 2 prison officers should not force prisoners to also endure un-
necessary, dehumanizing and humiliating pain. 173 Rehabilitation will
not be achieved unless prison officials respect prisoners individual rights
and inherent worth as humans.
It is obvious that, other things being equal, reformative efforts
have the best chance of being successful-without too much
frustration of the interests of retribution and deterrence-if the
conditions of imprisonment are such that the offender not only
knows that he is being "punished" (i.e., he is being deprived of
his liberty and of certain creature comforts), but also knows
that, because his dignity as a man is respected, efforts directed
toward his reformation are genuine and sincere.1
74
The Court correctly concluded that any time prison officials inflict
unnecessary harm on prisoners, society's standards of decency are vio-
lated.' 7 5 The Court's recognition of prisoners' rights, by holding seri-
ous injury is not necessary to bring an Eighth Amendment claim, is a
step in the right direction. Unfortunately, the Court's establishment of
malicious and sadistic as the subjective test for all excessive force claims
moves Eighth Amendment jurisprudence backwards. In Rhodes, the
Court warned itself to proceed cautiously in making an Eighth Amend-
ment judgment because, "unless we reverse it, '[a] decision that a given
punishment is impermissible under the Eighth Amendment cannot be
reversed short of a constitutional amendment,' and thus '[rlevisions can-
not be made in light of further experience.' "176 The Court should have
heeded its own warning and proceeded with care and caution in estab-
lishing malicious and sadistic as the subjective standard for all excessive
tion, Prisoners' Rights, and Violence, 7 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 413 (1984);Jerome Michael &
Herbert Wechsler, A Rationale of the Law of Homicide H, 37 COLUM. L. REV. 1261, 1264-69,
1318-19 (1937); Herbert Wechsler &Jerome Michael, A Rationale of the Law of Homicide: I,
37 COLUM. L. REV. 701 (1937).
170. 417 U.S. 817, 822-23 (1974).
171. id.
172. See Finney v. Arkansas Bd. of Correction, 505 F.2d 194, 215 (8th Cir. 1974)
("[Slegregation from society and loss of one's liberty are the only punishment the law
allows."); seealso RUBIN, supra note 169, at 697-734; 1 ToRcIA, supra note 169, § 21 nn.51-
53.
173. See DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't. of Social Services, 489 U.S. 189, 199-
200 (1989) ("when the State takes a person into its custody and holds him there against his
will, the Constitution imposes upon it a corresponding duty to assume some responsibility
for his safety and general well-being."). For further discussion, see Project, Prisoners'
Rights, 80 GEO. L.J. 1677 (1992); Project, Prisoners' Rights, 79 GEO. L.J. 1253 (1991); Pro-
ject, Prisoners' Rights, 78 GEO. L.J. 1429 (1990).
174. 1 TORCIA, supra note 169, § 4. See also Michael & Wechsler, Homicide II, supra note
169 at 1322.
175. Hudson, 112 S. Ct. at 1000.
176. Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 351 (1981) (citing Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S.
153, 176 (1976)).
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force claims. Malicious and sadistic is too high of a threshold to require
prisoners to prove in all excessive force claims.
The Court justifies the decision by somehow arriving at the conclu-
sion that a prison riot does not differ much from a lesser disturbance.'
77
The Court's reasoning is difficult to understand. The basis of Whitley's
malicious and sadistic standard was the existence of a disturbance that
indisputably posed significant risks to the safety of inmates and prison
staff. 178 Unfortunately, crisis situations inherently involve quick deci-
sions that may prove irresponsible or reckless when reviewed once the
emergency has passed. When an immediate threat to the lives of prison
staff and inmates presents itself officials should be able to make quick
decisions without incurring liability for conduct short of malicious and
sadistic. The situation in Whitley, where prisoners riot and take a prison
guard hostage, provides an appropriate context for the malicious and
sadistic standard to govern. 179 However, situations such as the one in
Hudson do not present the same concerns. Hudson was a handcuffed
prisoner who argued with a guard-he posed no significant risks.' 80
There were no administrative concerns requiring quick decisions in or-
der to protect the lives of the prison staff and inmates. Absent an emer-
gency situation, prison officials should not be allowed latitude to
administer unnecessary pain of any kind. Furthermore, the malicious
and sadistic standard leaves the Eighth Amendment open to abuse by
prison officials. Any testimony from a prison official, whether honest or
fabricated, that a prisoner was menacing or threatening in any way pro-
vides a defense that pain was not inflicted maliciously and sadistically.
The standard will be difficult for a fact finder to apply because the Court
gave no solid guidelines about how to distinguish malicious and sadistic
from a "good faith effort."' 18 1 The majority should have acquiesced to
the opinions of Justice Stevens and Justice Blackmun and left the stan-
dard at unnecessary and wanton.'
8 2
Justice Thomas' dissenting opinion leaves one to wonder exactly
what position he takes on applying the Eighth Amendment to prisoner's
claims after incarceration.'18 Applying a strict, historical precedent
based approach, Justice Thomas initially suggests that he believes the
Eighth Amendment should apply only to punishments meted out by
statutes or sentencing judges. 18 4 Next, Justice Thomas hints of a will-
ingness to abide by the Court's decision to apply the Eighth Amendment
to prisoner's claims if the serious injury requirement is kept.' 8 5 The
reader is left to wonder which position Justice Thomas prefers. He de-
177. Hudson, 112 S. Ct. at 998-99.
178. Whitley, 475 U.S. at 320.
179. See supra notes 41-61 and accompanying text.
180. Hudson, 112 S. Ct. at 997. See supra notes 78-97 and accompanying text.
181. See supra note 112 and accompanying text.
182. Hudson, 112 S. Ct. at 1002-04. For further discussion of Justice Stevens's and
Justice Blackmun's opinions, see supra notes 136-46 and accompanying text.
183. Hudson, 112 S. Ct. at 1005-10. See also Taylor, supra note 148 at 16.
184. Hudson, 112 S. Ct. at 1005-06.
185. Id. at 1006-10.
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fends both positions by holding forth the precedents of the Court and
insisting that precedent unconditionally govern, ' 8 6 however, the Consti-
tution must be applied, not with an eye toward yesterday, but with the
vision of the present.' 8 7 Justice Thomas fails to do this by demonstrat-
ing insensitivity to a prisoner's right to be constitutionally protected
from the deliberate infliction of unnecessary pain. However, his analysis
of Eighth Amendment claims brought by prisoners in medical needs and
prison condition contexts does support his assertion that the Court's
precedents have required a serious element in those cases to meet the
objective test.' 8 8 This raises the question of whether the "serious" re-
quirement in medical needs and prison condition cases is open for
challenge.
Thomas's main disagreement with the majority hinged on the defi-
nition of "serious injury." In Thomas's view, by definition any punish-
ment that is "diabolic and inhuman" inflicts serious injury. 18 9 He
concluded that the majority opinion requires injuries be physical to be
considered injuries at all, and that there are many types of injury that
leave no physical manifestations. 190 However, this line of analysis
seems to contradict Thomas's critique of the majority for allegedly aban-
doning the "objective standard." Thomas insists that some objective
form of injury is required, but then insists that psychological forms of
injury-which are by definition subjective-need also be included in the
category of Eighth Amendment violative injuries. It becomes quite un-
clear exactly what standard he advocates.
Thomas appears to lose focus of the basic facts of this case: three
prison guards, acting in concert, inflicted a humiliating beating on a
shackled prisoner. This beating was the result of a minor altercation
between prisoner and guard. Although Thomas champions the signifi-
cance of non-physical, psychological injuries as a potential source of
Eighth Amendment transgressions, he failed to consider the potential
psychological impact of the punishment meted out to Hudson. While
the majority may have reached its decision through a rather circuitous
186. Id. at 1005-11.
187. See Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 442-43 (1934):
It is no answer ... to insist that what the provision of the Constitution meant to
the vision of [the framers'] day it must mean to the vision of our time. If by the
statement that what the Constitution meant at the time of its adoption it means
to-day, it is intended to say that the great clauses of the Constitution must be
confined to the interpretation which the framers, with the conditions and outlook
of their time, would have placed upon them, the statement carries its own
refutation.
188. Hudson, 112 S. Ct. at 1006 (citing Estelle, 429 U.S. at 106 ("acts or omissions suffi-
ciently harmful to evidence deliberate indifference to serious medical needs")) (citing Wilson,
111 S. Ct. at 2324) ("was the deprivation sufficiently serious?")).
189. Id. at 1009.
190. Id. at 1009. "Many things-beating with a rubber truncheon, water torture, elec-
tric shock, incessant noise, reruns of 'Space 1999'-may cause agony as they occur yet
leave no inflicting injury. The state is not free to inflict such pains without cause just so
long as it is careful to leave no marks" Id. (citing Williams v. Boles, 841 F.2d 181, 183 (7th
Cir. 1988)).
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and unsatisfying path, clearly its result is preferable to the harsh result
which Thomas's opinion would dictate.
The Court's refusal to address whether an isolated incident of vio-
lence against a prisoner is punishment under the Eighth Amendment
leaves doubt as to whether this decision will stand or be extremely nar-
rowed in the future. The Court should have addressed the issue and left
no doubt.19 1 If, at a later date, the Court determines that isolated beat-
ings are not within the Eighth Amendment's definition of punishment,
prisoners will be in a worse position then they were before Hudson. At
that point, their access to the courts will be extremely narrow and the
subjective threshold they will have to prove to be successful in their
claims will likely remain at malicious and sadistic.
V. CONCLUSION
The Eighth Amendment analysis after Hudson still includes both an
objective and a subjective test. Hudson makes it easier for prisoners to
meet the objective test, thus making it easier for them to file suits. Yet
Hudson also makes it harder for prisoners to meet the subjective test,
meaning fewer prisoner's claims will be successful. If the threat of law-
suits has a deterrent effect on prison officials, the decision will provide a
positive change in the criminal justice system. However, the higher sub-
jective threshold of malicious and sadistic will cause fewer claims to be
successful, which means changing the conditions of the current prison
system will be a slow process. The next major issue in Eighth Amend-
ment claims brought by prisoners after incarceration is determining
whether isolated beatings are "punishment" under the Amendment.
Prisoners have had a difficult enough time of proving that prison offi-
cials inflicted unnecessary and wanton pain. Proving the infliction of
malicious and sadistic pain may prove nearly impossible. Eighth
Amendment jurisprudence may have taken one step forward and two
steps back.
Dale E. Butler
191. The Court granted certiorari specifically on the objective issue of whether the
Eighth Amendment is violated by anything less than serious injury. Hudson, 112 S. Ct. at
1004 (Thomas,J., dissenting). Since the Court decided to go beyond this issue and estab-
lish a new subjective standard, it should have further clarified whether "isolated beatings"
constituted Eighth Amendment violations.
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